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Abstract
Decision research has only
recently started to take seri-
ously the role of emotions in
choices and decisions. Regret is
the emotion that has received
the most attention. In this arti-
cle, we sample a number of the
initial regret studies from psy-
chology and economics, and
trace some of the complexities
and contradictions to which
they led. We then sketch a new
theory, decision justification
theory (DJT), which synthe-
sizes several apparently con-
flicting findings. DJT postulates
two core components of deci-
sion-related regret, one associ-
ated with the (comparative)
evaluation of the outcome, the
other with the feeling of self-
blame for having made a poor
choice. We reinterpret several
existing studies in DJT terms.
We then report  some new
studies that directly tested
(and support) DJT, and pro-
pose a number of research is-
sues that follow from this new
approach to regret.
Keywords
regret; decision making; emo-
tion; decision justification theory
Decision researchers have only
recently started to take seriously an
aspect of making choices that every
lay person already knows about:
Making a choice, whether of a va-
cation destination, a spouse, a med-
ical treatment, or a career, can be
an intensely emotional experience.
Of course, most people give such
decisions careful thought: What are
the options? What consequences
might each lead to? How likely are
they? How desirable are they? But,
in addition to these important cog-
nitive considerations, there are
strong emotional factors. At the time
of the decision, the person has feel-
ings about the decision itself (fear
of surgery, anxiety about a career
choice) and expectations about
feelings he or she may experience
later (relief at a good outcome, sad-
ness at a poor one). After the fact,
the individual experiences emotions,
which may or may not track with
the earlier expectations.
The emotion that has received
the most research attention from
decision theorists is regret. Most
people can readily recall or imag-
ine situations in which a poor deci-
sion led to painful regret. In the
early 1980s, researchers in both lab-
oratory and field settings started to
produce elegant theories and vivid
demonstrations of the antecedents
and consequences of regret. Contin-
ued research through the 1990s
overturned some of these early
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findings, modified others, and led
to a more complex and comprehen-
sive understanding of regret in de-
cisions.
In this short review, we first
sample a number of the initial
studies, and trace some of the com-
plexities and contradictions to
which they led. We then sketch a
new model that synthesizes these
apparently conflicting findings and
identify several research issues for
new work.
EARLY STUDIES
Perhaps the best-known of the
early regret studies is by Kahneman
and Tversky (1982). They asked stu-
dents to assess the regret that
would be felt by two investors,
both of whom lose $1,200, one as a
result of buying a particular stock,
the other as a result of holding on
to the same stock. A stunning 92%
of the respondents guessed that the
active buyer would feel more re-
gret than the passive holder. A bad
outcome resulting from action
seemed to be more regrettable than
the same bad outcome when it was
the result of inaction.
Intriguingly, just the opposite pat-
tern emerged from a series of stud-
ies by Gilovich and Medvec (1995)
looking at retrospective regrets. Peo-
ple asked to recall real-life regrets
tended to recall omissions more fre-
quently than commissions, the ad-
ventures they had passed up rather
than the leaps they had taken.
Gilovich and Medvec argued that
regret follows a characteristic tem-
poral pattern: Regrettable actions
hurt more than omissions in the
short run, but when looking back,
people experience more regret over
paths not taken. Research we de-
scribe later showed, however, that
people may regret inactions more
than actions in the short run also.
Economic choice theorists (e.g.,
Loomes & Sugden, 1982) have also
studied regret (though their use of
the word differs from ordinary
usage; Connolly & Butler, 2002).
These theorists predicted that people
would feel regret if a decision out-
come was worse than what they
would have received by choosing a
different option, and that they
would try to avoid options that ex-
posed them to this possibility. Initial
studies seemed to confirm these pre-
dictions, but newer experiments
(e.g., Starmer & Sugden, 1993) sug-
gest that these studies were flawed.
As a result, research in this tradition
seems mainly to have stopped.
There is, however, good evidence
that choices are influenced by antici-
pated regret, and that such anticipa-
tion is affected by whether or not one
expects to learn the outcomes of un-
chosen options (Zeelenberg, 1999).
DECISION JUSTIFICATION 
THEORY
To accommodate these conflict-
ing results, we propose a model of
regret called decision justification
theory (DJT). DJT postulates two
core components of decision-related
regret, one associated with the
(comparative) evaluation of the
outcome, the other with the feeling
of self-blame for having made a poor
choice. The overall feeling of regret
at some decision is a combination
of these two components: You
regret both that the outcome is
poorer than some standard (often
the outcome of the option you re-
jected) and that the decision you
made was, in retrospect, unjustified.
The two components do not nec-
essarily go together. Someone
might experience high self-blame
regret even when the outcome is
good. Suppose that you leave a
party somewhat inebriated and de-
cide to drive home rather than take
a cab. You arrive home safely, but
the following morning you are
racked with regret as you think back
on your decision. You knew at the
time that you had had too much to
drink, and that options were avail-
able. You have no excuse: Your de-
cision to drive was entirely unjusti-
fied, and could easily have led to
disastrous outcomes. The actual
outcome was good, but you still
feel regret.
Compare this with another sce-
nario: Imagine yourself as a parent
trying to decide whether or not to
vaccinate your 1-year-old against
some serious disease. You consult
doctors, gather information, think
long and hard, and decide to vacci-
nate, despite knowing the vaccine
sometimes has bad side effects.
You are unlucky, and your child
suffers the bad side effects. Of
course, you regret this misfortune:
The outcome is not what you had
hoped (and would not have hap-
pened if you had decided against
vaccination). But, even in retro-
spect, you see no reason to blame
yourself. You did everything a pru-
dent parent could to make the best
possible choice. Your decision was
fully just i f ied (as  comforting
friends will remind you; being ab-
solved from blame is a great way to
reduce regret) .  Driving home
drunk leaves you with self-blame
regret but (if you are lucky) no
bad-outcome regret; an unfortu-
nate vaccination result leaves you
feeling bad-outcome regret, but not
the extra pain of self-blame.
Of course, most decisions that
result in bad outcomes generate
some mixture of these two regret
components. Sometimes a decision
that felt well justified at the time
appears unjustified later. Crawford,
McConnell, Lewis, and Sherman
(2002), for example, induced exper-
imental participants to follow the
(bad) advice of an unknown stranger
as to which of two football teams to
bet on, despite having detailed and
useful information on which to
base their bets. At the decision
point, most participants followed
the stranger’s advice. In retrospect,
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after they had bet and lost, they
seemed to scold themselves: “How
could I have been so stupid? In ret-
rospect, there was no reason for me
to trust this anonymous tipster. My
decision was unjustified.” In this
case, the regret appears to have in-
volved both poor-outcome and
self-blame components.
DJT provides a parsimonious ac-
count of many earlier findings on
regret. For example:
Simonson (1992) offered stu-
dents two imaginary choices:
whether to take advantage of a
current, moderate sale or wait
for a later, possibly better sale,
and whether to buy a bargain-
brand VCR or a more expensive,
well-known, high-quality brand
(a SONY). Control subjects dis-
played no clear preference in ei-
ther choice, but subjects asked to
think about the regret  they
might feel after making their de-
cision predominantly chose the
safer options (the current sale
and the SONY). Apparently
thinking about regret led them
to look for justifications for their
choices, and the safer brand and
guaranteed sale offered the justi-
fication they were looking for.
In separate studies of the role of
decision responsibility in regret
(Connolly, Ordóñez, & Coughlan,
1997; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, &
Manstead, 2000), we explored
how students expected to feel if
they changed course sections
and then found the section they
moved into was better than,
worse than, or the same as the
section they had left. Students
who made the decis ion for
themselves expected to feel
more regret if the outcome was
bad (and more rejoicing if the
outcome was good) than stu-
dents who had the same out-
come imposed on them by an ar-
bitrary computer reassignment.
However, even the computer-
assigned students expected to
•
•
feel substantial regret for a bad
outcome, despite having no de-
cision responsibility. Apparently
(though neither of us interpreted
the results this way at the time),
the computer-assigned group ex-
pected only outcome-evaluation
regret, whereas the self-choice
group considered possible self-
blame regret as well. (It is also
interesting that the key reference
point in all these studies was the
status quo, the quality of the
course section initially assigned.
A variety of reference points
may be involved in regret-
related comparisons.)
In another study (Zeelenberg,
Van den Bos, Van Dijk, & Piet-
ers, 2002), participants were
asked how much regret a soccer
coach would feel if his team lost
after he either changed or did
not change the team—a soccer
parallel of the two-investors
problem discussed earlier. As in
the case of the investors, partici-
pants expected more regret for
the active than for the inactive
coach—but only if the team had
previously been enjoying a win-
ning record. If the team had
been losing, the inactive coach
was seen as feeling more regret.
In DJT terms, the winning coach
was unjustified in changing his
team, and can thus be blamed
for the subsequent loss. In con-
trast, the losing coach was justi-
fied in making changes, even if
they did not immediately work
out, and thus was expected to
feel less blame, and less regret.
Seta, McElroy, and Seta (2001) ran
a between-subjects replication of
the two-investors problem, but
attaching short  personality
sketches of the investors as ei-
ther cautious risk avoiders or en-
trepreneurial risk takers. They
replicated Kahneman and Tver-
sky’s original result (more regret
expected for action than for inac-
tion) for the cautious investors,
•
•
but found the reverse for the
bolder investors, who were seen
as regretting losses from inac-
tion more than losses from action.
Apparently behavior can some-
times be justified by its consis-
tency with one’s personality.
These are, of course, simply post
hoc reinterpretations in DJT terms
of findings from existing studies
(though we are impressed with the
ease with which the theory re-
solves apparently conflicting re-
sults). We have also undertaken
several direct tests of the theory. In
one (Connolly & Reb, 2002), we
took three scenarios (the vaccina-
tion, two-investors, and soccer-coach
problems) and asked subjects to as-
sess a range of emotions the pro-
tagonists might feel if the decision
turned out badly. We also asked
them to rate five short arguments
that one might use to guide deci-
sion making in each context (e.g.,
“When it comes to [this topic], I
just have to trust my gut instincts
about what to do”; “It is better to
sit still in situations like this than to
take action”). Half the participants
evaluated these arguments before,
and half evaluated them after, as-
sessing the protagonists’ likely
emotions. Considering the argu-
ments was intended to prime the
participants with a range of alter-
native rationales that could miti-
gate the feelings of decision-related
regret when things went wrong. In
two of the three scenarios, this is
exactly what we found: For both
the vaccination and the soccer-
coach scenarios, the active protago-
nist was seen as significantly less
regretful by participants who had
just read the justificatory argu-
ments than by those who had not.
(Interestingly, the appropriateness
of the arguments varied signifi-
cantly across scenarios. A justifica-
tion that is perfectly appropriate for
an investment decision may be
seen as inappropriate for a health-
care decision for one’s child.)
Copyright © 2002 American Psychological Society
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 215
A second test of DJT (Inman &
Zeelenberg, 2002) studied con-
sumer regrets. In the scenarios used
in this study, consumers either
made repeat purchases or switched
products. In some experimental
conditions, subjects got information
justifying the consumer’s decision
(e.g., she had bought the product
only once before, found it unsatis-
factory, and switched); in other
conditions, the decision seemed un-
justified (e.g., she had bought the
product several times before, liked
it, but switched anyway). The study
showed that regret over poor out-
comes was associated not with
whether the consumer switched or
stayed, but with whether or not the
decision was justified.
A third set of related studies
(Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2002) exam-
ined the regret people experience
when they behave in ways they did
not originally intend. These studies
showed that such inconsistency,
which is often hard to justify, am-
plifies regret independently of the
outcomes of the behavior. This in-
consistency effect was obtained us-
ing a scenario approach (Study 1),
when people were asked about au-
tobiographical memories of regret-
table events (Study 2), and in a lon-
gitudinal study of a significant
real-life decision, voting in national
elections (Study 3). These results
suggest that the notion of justifi-
ability as put forward in DJT may
also explain other effects of deci-
sion procedures on regret.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We have been surprised too
often in our studies of regret to
prophesy with any confidence
where the next steps will come, but
there are plenty of excellent re-
search topics available. As yet, psy-
chologists know almost nothing
about the sorts of arguments that
make for good justifications, whether
people vary systematically in the
justifications they find compelling,
and whether people produce justi-
fications spontaneously or only un-
der prompting. Understanding the
production of justifications might
provide a basis for “regret ther-
apy,” for helping people find the
rationales that will work for them
in reducing painful regret. It might
even help them make better deci-
sions. For example, when we asked
subjects to rate justifications (Con-
nolly & Reb, 2002), one of the best
general-purpose justifications was
that one made a careful, competent
decision based on a wide range of
input information. If anticipated
regret led people to engage in
thoughtful decision making of this
kind, it could lead directly to im-
proved decision making.
We are also eager to explore the
effects of decision-related rejoicing,
if that is the positive emotion that
corresponds to regret. (Preliminary
data in Connolly & Butler, 2002,
suggest that regret and rejoicing
may not be simple polar oppo-
sites.) Certainly people expect posi-
tive decision outcomes to lead to
rejoicing, though as yet there is lit-
tle evidence that justification af-
fects such rejoicing. Good out-
comes seem not to provoke the
sorts of soul-searching that trigger
regret and the search for justifica-
tion. Regret and rejoicing may thus
be driven by rather different mech-
anisms, and are not necessarily
mirror images of one another.
The issues, then, are wide open.
The emotional side of decision mak-
ing is clearly important, but research-
ers are only now starting to under-
stand it. Compared with the huge
research literature describing how
people think, and should think,
about their decisions, the research on
how people feel in and about the de-
cision-making process is in its in-
fancy.  The research we have
sketched here considers one emotion,
regret, and describes some of the sub-
tle ways in which it influences, and is
influenced by, the choices people
make. As researchers improve their
understanding of regret and other
decision-related emotions, people
should be able to improve their
choices, and their feelings about the
consequences of those choices. We
feel good about the prospect.
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Is Laughter the Best Medicine? Humor, 
Laughter, and Physical Health
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Abstract
This article examines re-
search evidence for the popu-
la r  idea  tha t  humor  and
laughter have beneficial ef-
fects on physical health. Poten-
tial theoretical mechanisms for
such effects are discussed first.
Empirical evidence for benefi-
c ia l  e f fec ts  o f  humor  and
laughter on immunity, pain
tolerance, blood pressure, lon-
gevity, and illness symptoms is
then summarized. Overall, the
evidence for health benefits of
humor and laughter is less con-
clusive than commonly be-
lieved. Future research in this
area needs to be more theoreti-
cally driven and methodologi-
cally rigorous.
Keywords
humor; laughter; health; im-
munity; pain
Belief in beneficial effects of hu-
mor and laughter on physical
health has become increasingly
popular in recent years. The media
frequently report claims about sci-
entific evidence for health benefits
of humor and laughter. Some prac-
titioners have even begun to advo-
cate the use of “therapeutic hu-
mor” in the treatment of illness and
maintenance of health, and clowns
and comedy carts have become fa-
miliar sights in many hospitals.
The idea that laughter is good for
one’s health can be traced to bibli-
cal times, and was revived periodi-
cally by various physicians and
philosophers through the centuries.
In recent decades, interest in the
healing power of laughter was
given new impetus by the best-sell-
ing account by Cousins (1979) of
his recovery from a progressive and
painful rheumatoid disease after
treating himself with daily bouts of
laughter, along with massive doses
of vitamin C.
THEORETICAL MECHANISMS
How might humor and laugh-
ter influence physical health?
There are at least four potential
mechanisms, each involving a dif-
ferent aspect of humor, and each
suggesting different implications
for the application of humor to
well-being. First, laughter might
produce physiological changes in
various systems of the body, which
may have beneficial effects on
health. Various authors have sug-
gested, for example, that vigorous
laughter exercises and relaxes mus-
cles, improves respiration, stimulates
circulation, increases the production
of pain-killing endorphins, decreases
the production of stress-related hor-
mones, and enhances immunity. Ac-
cording to this theoretical model,
hearty laughter is crucial in the hu-
mor-health connection, whereas hu-
morous perceptions and amusement
without laughter would not be ex-
pected to confer any health benefits.
Second, humor and laughter
might affect health by inducing pos-
itive emotional states, which may
in turn have beneficial effects on
health, such as increasing pain tol-
erance, enhancing immunity, and
undoing the cardiovascular conse-
quences of negative emotions (Fred-
rickson, 2000). Compared with the
first model, this model gives humor
and laughter a less unique role in
health enhancement, as they are only
one means of increasing positive
emotions, along with love, joy, op-
timism, and so forth. Furthermore,
according to this model, overt
laughter may not even be neces-
sary for health benefits to occur, be-
cause humor and amusement may
induce positive moods even with-
out laughter.
Third, humor might benefit
health indirectly by moderating the
adverse effects of stress on health.
A considerable body of research in-
dicates that stressful life experi-
ences can have adverse effects on
various aspects of health, including
suppression of the immune system
and increased risk of infectious dis-
ease and heart disease (O’Leary,
